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ASPECTS OF GUARDIANSHIP IN VIRGINIA
A. INTRODUCTION
"A guardian is a person lawfully invested with the power,
and charged with the duty, of taking care of the person and
managing the property and rights of another person, who, for
some peculiarity of status, or defect of age, understanding, or
self-control, is considered incapable of administering his own
affairs'.
As can be seen, the definition mentions nothing to give
effect to the popular idea that a guardian implies an orphan or
at least that the father is dead. This is a common misconcep-
tion and has no legal significance. Furthermore, such a broad
statement makes the term applicable to persons charged with
the care of lunatics, aged, and profligates, etc., while "guardian"
as employed in the Virginia Code refers to a person charged
with the care and management of a minor.
The history of guardianship is as old as civilization itself,
since the normal and most frequent guardian-ward relationship
is that of a guardian by nature, i.e., the natural parents of the
minor2. At Roman law, a person charged with the minor's
person and his education was called a "tutor", while a person
charged with the estate of a minor was called a "curator".
This distinction still exists in Virginia; however, the term
"guardian" encompasses both curator and tutor, and it is there-
fore incumbent upon the lawyer to ascertain the power of the
guardian when dealing with a problem of this nature'. A guard-
ian in Virginia may have power over the person, the estate, or
both.
1 Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Ed.).
2 Va. Code, § 31-1 (1950).
3 Va. Code §§ 31-1 to 31-36 (1950); §§ 31-19 to 31-25 (1950) being
enacted by the General Assembly in 1956 (Acts of Assembly, 1956,
Ch. 226) was repealed by the General Assembly in 1958 (Acts of
Assembly, 1958, Ch. 557). Effective date of repeal, July 1, 1958.
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Of the many forms of guardianship which existed at com-
mon law, Virginia now recognizes five: guardian by nature4 ,
testamentary guardian5, guardian by election, court appointed
guardian7, and guardian ad litem. Other types of guardian.
relationships which are relevant to the above mentioned are:
curator', guardian de facto", prochien ami, conservator" ,
and committee"3 .
The functions of each of the above vary slightly either as
to the power bestowed upon them or the method of application
of the power due to a particular circumstance: natural guard-
ians are charged with the care of the person of the minor 4 ,
testamentary guardians usually have control of the estate since
it would be repugnant to public policy to permit a guardian
to control the ward's person if a natural parent were surviv-
ing' 5, both the guardian by election and court appointed guard-
ian have control and custody over the person and the estate of
the ward" , a guardian ad litem is appointed by the court solely
where the minor is a defendant in an action and the only duties
are to faithfully represent the interest or estate of the minor"7 ,
a curator is appointed by the court until the proper appoint-
4 Va. Code § 31-1 (1950).
5 Va. Code § 31-2 (1950).
6Va. Code § 31-5 (1950). See 1958 Cumulative Supplement for amend-
ment.
7 Va. Code § 31-5 (1950). See 1958 Cumulative Supplement for amend-
ment.
8 Va. Code § 8-88 (1950).
9 Va. Code § 31-7 (1950).
10 Evans v. Pierce, et al., 15 Grat. (Va. 56) 513 (1860).
11 Va. Code § 8-87 (1950).
12 Va. Code §§ 26-68 to 26-71 (1950).
13Va. Code § 37-201 (1950) (Insane); Va. Code § 53-305 (1950) (Convict).
1 4 Va. Code § 31-1 (1950).
15Va. Code § 31-2 (1950).
10 Va. Code § 31-8 (1950).
17Va. Code § 8-88 (1950).
ment and qualification of a guardian and has all the powers
and the duties as a guardian appointed by the court and shall
be equally responsibleS, a guardian de facto, or de son tort,
is purely a creature of a court of equity, and is one who takes
possession of an infant's property without right or lawful
authority and will be required to account in the same manner
as if he were de jure' 9, the prochien ami, or next friend, is any
person who sues in the name of the minor, subject to the
court's disapproval that he is not acting for the benefit of the
minor2", a conservator is appointed by the court to take care
of an absentee's estate and the court can order the conservator
to support the wife, children, or any other suitable dependents21,
a committee is appointed by the court to control the estate of
any person who is insane or otherwise incompetent 2 , or a
convict"3 .
B. JURISDICTION TO APPOINT GUARDIAN
The status of guardianship is acquired by court appoint-
ment with the exception of the natural parents of the minor
as stated in the Virginia Code § 31-1 (1950), and testamentary
guardians in the Virginia Code § 31-2 (1950).
The jurisdiction of appointment of guardians is precisely
stated by statute:
The circuit court of any county, or the circuit court
or corporation court of any city, except the City of Rich-
mond, in which any minor resides, or, if he be a resident
out of the state, in which he has any estate, or the judge
in vacation, or the clerk at any time may appoint a
guardian for him unless he have a guardian appointed
18 Va. Code § 31-7 (1950).
19 Gayle v. Hayes, 79 Va. 542 (1884); Anderson v. Smith, 102 Va. 697,
48 SE. 29 (1904); Watts v. Watts, 104 Va. 269, 51 SE. 350 (1905);
Starke v. Storm, 115 Va. 651, 79 S.F. 1057 (1913).
20Wilson v. Smith, 22 Gratt. (63 Va.) 493 (1872); Womble v. Gunter,
198 Va. 522, 95 SE.2d 213 (1958); Va. Code § 8-87 (1950).
21 Va. Code §§ 26-68, 26-69 (1950).
22Va. Code § 37-201 (1950).
2 3 Va. Code §§ 53-305 (1950) (Resident), 53-306 (1950) (Non-Resident).
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as aforesaid by his father or mother. The Chancery
Court and Hustings Court, Part Two, of the City of
Richmond, within their respective territorial jurisdic-
tions as defined by law and the judges in vacation, and
the clerks and their duly qualified deputies at any time,
shall have this power.
All appointments of guardians heretofore made by
clerk of the courts hereinbefore mentioned, whether in
term, time or vacation, are declared to be as valid and
binding and the same force and effect as if such ap-
pointments had been specifically authorized by law at
the time they were made 4.
This power to appoint has been understood to mean in the
capacity as courts of chancery. The statute does not specifically
state this but it has been decided judicially 5 . It is stated in
the Virginia Code2" that the courts acting in their capacity as
courts of equity are ". .. to hear and determine all matters
between guardians and wards ... " In Buchanan v. Buchanan,
the court said:
... the court of chancery as representing the parental
and protecting power of the Commonwealth, has juris-
diction to determine controversies concerning the guard-
ianship of a minor; to make orders for his support, if
any property capable of being so applied be within the
reach of the court; and in extreme cases as we have
seen, even to control the right of a father to the custody
of his child2 .
24 Va. Code § 31-4 (1950); Va. Constitution § 101-Power of clerk of court
to appoint Guardian. Clerks of courts; jurisdiction in cases of wills,
insane persons, etc.-The General Assembly may confer upon the clerks
of the several courts having probate jurisdiction, jurisdiction of the
probate of wills, and of the appointment and qualification of guardians,
personal representatives, curators, appraisers, and committees of persons
adjudged insane or convicted of felony, and in the matter of the sub-
stitution of trustees. Also see, Horn v. Horn, 195 Va. 912, 81 S.E.2d 593
(1954).
25Ficklin v. Ficklin, 2 Va. Cas. 204 (1820); Durrett v. Davis, 24 Gratt.
(65 Va.) 302 (1874).
26Va. Code § 31-40 (1950).
27 170 Va. 458, 197 SE. 426 (1938).
C. GENERAL EFFECT OF APPOINTMENT
The statutes have made a distinction between the method
of appointment of a guardian by election and a court appointed
guardian although for all intents and purposes they are iden-
tical. In the case of a minor under the age of fourteen years,
the proper court will nominate and appoint a guardian. If
the minor is over fourteen years, the minor himself may
nominate a guardian which, however, is subject to the court's
approval before the appointment is conferred28. The Court is
under no obligation to accept the ward's nomination and ap-
point said nominee, but may appoint someone other than the
person selected by the ward29. The wardship, therefore, results
not so much from the election of the infant as from the ap-
pointment of the court. Consequently, this type of guardian
may be considered as identical with that appointed by the
chancery court" .
By statute a guardian ad litem for an infant defendant shall
be appointed by the court in which the suit is pending or if in
vacation by the judge of the same or by the clerk of the court
and where it is deemed necessary for the best interest of the
minor, the guardian ad litem may be removed and a new
guardian ad litem appointed 1 . The necessity of the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interest or estate
of a minor is strongly supported by case law, and that ". . . a
personal judgment rendered against an infant for whom no
guardian ad litem has been appointed is void. The rule is the
same whether applied in law or equity32.
A prochien ami as previously noted is not a court appointed
officer. However, if it appears that the suit is not for the benefit
28 Va. Code § 31-5 (1950).
29 Ham v. Ham, 15 Gratt. (56 Va.) 74 (1859).
30 Minor's INSTITUTES, Vol. 1, p. 427.
3 1 Va. Code § 8-88 (1950).
3 2 Turner v. Barrand, 102 Va. 324, 46 S.E. 318 (1904); Jefferies v.
Jefferies, 123 Va. 147, 96 S.E. 197 (1918); Kanter v. Holland, 154
Va. 120, 152 S.E. 328 (1930); Broyhill v. Dawson, 168 Va. 321, 191
S.E. 779 (1937).
of the minor or the next friend is not a proper person, the court
may either dismiss the suit without prejudice or assign another
prochien ami to prosecute the action33. A curator is appointed
by the court or judge until a guardian is appointed34 . Natural
guardians are recognized by statute as being the rightful guard-
ians and no judicial appointment is therefore necessary 5. A
testamentary appointee is also recognized by statute and will
be accepted as the proper person unless he fails to qualify36.
D. TESTAMENTARY APPOINTMENT
At common law the father of a minor was the sole possessor
of the power to make testamentary appointments of guardians.
This rule was adhered to in Virginia until 1892, when the legis-
lature amended the Code 7 so that both mother and father
could make a testamentary appointment of a guardian for the
estate left by the deceased spouse to the minor38. A surviving
spouse succeeds as the natural guardian notwithstanding that
there be a guardian appointed by the deceased spouse's will or
by appointment as long as the surviving spouse remains un-
married and fit39. In the absence of a chancery appointment to
the contrary this guardianship by nature prevails, even though
the surviving spouse may remarry4".
B. EFFECT OF ILLEGITIMACY ON NATURAL GUARDIANSHIP
The natural guardian statute is applicable only to legitimate
children; however, it has been decided judicially that the father
of an illegitimate child succeeds as guardian in the event of
33Va. Code § 31-14 (1950); Wilson v. Smith, 22 Gratt. (63 Va.) 493
(1872); Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 28 SXE.2d 40 (1943).
34 Va. Code § 31-7 (1950).
35 Va. Code § 31-1 (1950).
3OVa. Code § 31-2 (1950) (Appointment), § 31-3 (1950) (Qualification).
37 Va. Acts of Assembly, 1891-92, Ch. 255, p. 431.
38 Va. Code § 31-2 (1950).
89 Armstrong v. Stone, et. ux., 9 Gratt. 102, 105 (1852).
40 Id. at p. 107; Coffee and Wife v. Black, 82 Va. 567 (1866).
the death of the mother. This of course does not negate the
paramount rule in all guardianship actions that ". . . all the
rights of a parent or guardian to the custody of the child are
subordinate to the interest of the child itself. Where that in-
terest demands it, the rights of the father, mother, or guardian
all may be disregarded41." The reasoning permitting the father
of an illegitimate child to have custody is ". . . that we cannot
assume him to be wanting in affection because his child is
illegitimate." The Court also quoted with approval the follow-
ing dictum from Moritz v. Carnhart:
Though a bastard be not looked upon as a child for
any civil purpose, the ties of nature are respected in
regards to maintenance. The putative father, though not
legally related to it, is so far considered its natural guard-
ian as to be entitled to the custody of it4".
F. NON-RESIDENT GUARDIAN
The present Virginia statute43, prohibits a non-resident
from being appointed or allowed to qualify in the capacity
of a guardian. In the case of a corporation being nominated,
it must be authorized to do business in the State.
This prohibition extends to foreign guardians already ap-
pointed in the alien state, but is ameliorated by permitting the
appointment of a co-fiduciary to assist the non-resident guardian
where the non-resident guardian is desirous of serving. The
co-fiduciary so appointed must be a resident of the state or a
corporation authorized to do business in the state. Where the
non-resident guardian is a natural parent, the resident guardian
is not intended to have control over the person of the minor.
If the minor is living in a foreign state but has an estate in
Virginia, it is proper to appoint a guardian in the state44 .
41 Hayes v. Strauss, 151 Va. 136, 144 S.E. 432 (1928).
42 7 Watts (Pa.) 302, 32 Am. Dec. 762 (1838).
43 Va. Code §26-59 (1950).
44 Taliaferro v. Day, 82 Va. 79 (1886).
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G. QUALIFICATION OF A GUARDIAN
The judge or court or clerk by which the guardian is ap-
pointed shall require a bond with security to be given by the
appointees where it is deemed necessary, for the best interest
of the minor. If the judge or clerk fails to require a bond,
the official in default shall be liable to the ward for any
damages sustained due to the omission45. Where the value of
the ward's estate does not exceed the amount of five hundred
dollars, the court may permit a guardian to qualify without
requiring security on the guardian's bond4 6. The appointee
upon refusal or inability to give bond shall be replaced either
by the immediate appointment of another person to serve as
guardian or by an interim appointment of a curator to act
until a guardian is appointed41 . The requirement of giving
bond is not necessary for a testamentary guardian provided
the will so directs4". Also, where it appears that the law of
a foreign state in which the infant resides and the foreign
guardian was appointed does not require a bond, the court
may in its discretion not require a bond and may permit the
money and estate be paid to the foreign guardian 9.
H. TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP
The authority of a guardian remains effective until the
minor attains the age of twenty-one years or in the case of
a female minor until she marries. Although the marriage of
a female minor terminates the guardianship, a receiver shall
be appointed to manage the estate until she attains the age
of twenty-one years"°. A testamentary guardian's duties also
45Va. Code § 31-6 (1950); See 1958 Cumulative Supplement for amendment.
46Va. Code § 26-4 (1950).
41 Page v. Taylor, 2 Munf. (16 Va.) 492 (1811). -
4sVa. Code § 31-6 (1950); See Va. Code § 6-95 (1950) (Bank acting
in fiduciary capacity not required to give security).
49Va. Code § 26-23 (1950).
50 Va. Code § 31-9 (1950). See Va. Code § 55-44 (1950) (Receiver ap-
pointed for female minor). General termination statutes: Guardian ad
litem, Va. Code § 8-88 (1950); Resident co-fiduciary, Va. Code § 26-67
(1950); Conservator, Va. Code § 26-70 (1950).
terminate as stated, except when the will expresses a desire
for an earlier termination. The status of guardianship shall
terminate if precedent to the occurrence of one of the above
events the guardian should die 1, be removed5", resign53, or
the ward should die. Where the court has deemed it necessary
to remove a guardian the court shall then appoint a new
guardian upon the removal of the old guardian or appoint
a curator to serve during the interim between the revocation
order and the new appointment".
. NEXT FRIEND SUITS
"Any minor entitled to sue may do so by his next friend55 ."
According to the procedure in Virginia, suits may be com-
menced and prosecuted by the next friend without a formal
appointment by the court and the approval of the person as
being beneficial to the interest of the minor is implied, unless
expressly disallowed. In the event that the next friend is
found to be either an unsuitable person or the suit is not for
the benefit of the minor, the court may either assign another
person to prosecute or dismiss the suit without prejudice56.
The suit by a next friend must be brought in the name of
the minor and this may be done without the consent of the
minor or even in the face of the minor's objection". The
next friend cannot waive any of the infant's rights and it
is error to decree on such waiver " . A decree rendered under
51 Armstrong v. Walkup, 12 Gratt. (53 Va.) 608 (1855).
52 Va. Code § 31-14 (1950); Va. Code § 26-3 (1950).
53 Va. Code § 26-46 (1950).
54 Va. Code § 26-47 (1950) (Appointment of new fiduciary); Va. Code
§ 31-14 (1950) (Jurisdiction of a court to appoint a guardian after
removal); Va. Code § 26-3 (1950).
55 Va. Code § 8-87 (1950).
56 Wilson v. Smith, 22 Gratt. (63 Va.) 493 (1872); Jackson v. Counts,
106 Va. 7, 54 S.E. 870 (1906).
57 Lemon v. Hansbarger, 6 Gratt. (47 Va.) 301 (1849); Sillings v. Bum-
gardner, 9 Gratt. (50 Va.) 273 (1852); Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111,
28 S.E.2d 40 1943).
58Hite v. Hite, 2 Rand (23 Va.) 409 (1824); Armstrong v. Walkup, 9
Grat. (50Va.) 102 (1852).
the "next friend" statute is binding against the infant in the
same degree and manner as an adult5".
J. MINOR'S PARTICIPATION
Notice of application for the custody of a minor need
only be given to the natural parents or a person who actually
has the custody of the minor"0 . It is not necessary to serve
a subpoena upon an infant defendant unless a judgment in
personam is desired. The procedure prescribed for the ap-
pointment of guardian ad litem will constitute due process
of law61. In an answer to the bill it is necessary that the minor,
if over fourteen years, and the guardian ad litem answer in
person and under oath6". "When an infant is over fourteen
years of age, it is error for him not to file an answer in proper
person"' ... and the answer must be under oath64."
K. FINALITY oF DECREE AGAINST MINOR
A special status for the benefit of minors and incompetents
extends the finality of a decree in that the judge may permit
an injunction to the decree and allow a bill of review to be
exhibited, provided, it is done within six months after the
removal of the disability, which in the case of a minor would
be attaining the age of twenty-one years65. This appears to be
a statutory attempt to reiterate and affirm in part the common
59 Gimbert v. Norfolk Southern R.R. Co., 152 Va. 684, 148 S.E. 680 (1929)
which stated, "It is well settled with us that an infant, as a general
rule, is as much bound by a decree against him as a person of full age.
The law recognizes no distinction between a decree against an infant and
a decree against an adult. And therefore it is that an infant can impeach
only upon the grounds which would invalidate it in the case of another
person, such as fraud, collusion, error."
60 Va. Code § 31-17 (1950).
61 RULES OF COURT, § 2-4; Lile's PLEADING & PRACTICE (3rd Ed.),
p. 34, § 55.
62 Va. Code § 8-679 (1950).
63 Cooper v. Hepburn, 15 Gratt. (56 Va.) 551 (1860).
64 Swarby v. Harkrader, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 112 (1877).
65 Va. Code § 8-613 (1950) (Injunction against decree subject to bill of
review).
law rule that "a decree in equity shall be held in the breast
of the court." The bill of review may be entered only after
the decree is final"0 , and the minor cannot impeach the decree
except on the same grounds for which a person of full age
could impeach 7, and the cause must have existed at the time
of the decree 8 . This statute, does not, nor was it intended,
to preclude an infant from asserting his rights by his next
friend against a decree prior to the infant attaining twenty-
one years plus six months, and the infant may do so whenever
he sees fit 9.
L. DEPOSITIONS
It is required that reasonable notice in writing shall be
given to the adverse party when it is desirous to have deposi-
tions taken"0 . It has been decided judicially that when a minor
is involved as a defendant in an action where a guardian ad
litem had no notice, depositions taken in the cause could not
be read against the infant parties". Even if the guardian ad
litem has received proper notice, it is also necessary in order
to be permitted to read a deposition against the infant for
the guardian ad litem to either be present upon the taking of
the deposition or to agree upon interrogatories"2 . An analogous
situation is that of the perpetuation of testimony of a minor
witness in which case it is incumbent upon the court to appoint
a guardian ad litem to attend on the minor's behaffrh.
66 Dellringer v. Foltz, 93 Va. 729, 25 S.E. 998 (1896).
67 Kavanaugh v. Shacklett, 111 Va. 423, 69 S.E. 335 (1910); Powers v.
Howard, 131 Va. 275, 108 S.F. 900 (1921); See, Note 58, supra.
68 Asberry v. Mitchell, 121 Va. 276, 93 S.E. 638 (1917).
69 Va. Code § 8-354 (1950) (Right of infant to show cause against decree);
Harrison v. Walton, 95 Va. 721, 30 S.E. 372 (1898).
70 Va. Code § 8-307 (1950).
71 Walker v. Grayson, 86 Va. 337, 10 S.E. 51 (1889); 2 V.D. 238, 23 S.E.
69 (1895).
72 Va. Code § 8-309 (1950).
7 3 Va. Code § 8-317 (1950).
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M. APPEAL OF QUALIFICATION OR APPOINTMENT
Any "person" who thinks himself aggrieved by either the
appointment or qualification of a guardian may present a pe-
tition to appeal the decree 4, irrespective of the jurisdictional
amount of three hundred dollars which is normally required,
except that the appeal be made-within the statute of limita-
tions7". The "person" referred to in the statute is a person
who was a party to the suit in the court below, and who was
aggrieved by the decree therein rendered. In order to render
one a proper party to an appeal, these two circumstances must
be metT. Generally, an appeal bond is required to be posted
before the appeal can take effect. However, where the appeal
is being made to protect the estate of an infant, no such bond
is necessary77.
M. CONCLUSION
Collectively, the Virginia guardianship statutes are ex-
cellent, both as to their thoroughness of coverage and their
equitable application. However, with all deference to the
necessity of brevity in statutory construction and procedure, it
is suggested that there be included in the Code a definite proced-
ure for the filing of an application of guardianship and particu-
larly that notice be given to interested parties beyond that which
is presently required, namely, mother, father, or the person
who actually has custody of a minor"8 .
At present the procedure for filing application is an in-
formal proceeding. Apparently all one need to do is to appear
before the clerk of the court and orally request to be appointed
guardian and, provided one can qualify by posting the ap-
propriate bond and security, the clerk of the court may within
the discretion of that office decide that he is a proper person,
74 Va. Code § 8-462(1) (a) (iv) (1950).
75 Va. Code § 8-463 (1950).
76Southern R. Co. v. Glenon, 102 Va. 529, 46 SE. 776 (1904); Snavely v.
Snavely, 151 Va. 270, 144 SE. 422 (1928).
77 Va. Code § 8-477 (1950).
78 Va. Code § 31-17 (1950).
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and duly qualify and appoint him as guardian. Notwithstanding
that the appointment is based upon a first-come-first-served
concept and that the discretionary power granted to the clerk
of the court is perhaps excessive, there remains the fact that
no notice is given to any party, except those mentioned previ-
ously' ', and the only person who may appeal a guardianship
appointment must have been (1) a party to the suit, and (2)
aggrieved by the decree. Obviously, if a person does not re-
ceive notice of an application for guardianship, he will probably
not appear to contest it. Having not appeared, he will thus
not be a party to the suit and hence unable to appeal the
appointment. The irony of the situation is that it may produce
an awkward and inequitable result to the minor, the very
person the State is trying to shield, since unless the person
appointed is not in some way unsuitable, regardless of how
superior another would be, it is impossible to remove the
first guardian. This leads to an illogical and incongruous
result when considered in the light of the purpose of the
guardian-ward relationship.
Unquestionably, the purpose is to promote the best in-
terest of the child. As stated in Fleshwood v. Fleshwood8 °,
"many citations might be added but through them all runs
the fixed purpose to advance the interest of the child. This
is ever the dominant consideration"- or in Hayes v. Strauss1 ,
".... in Virginia all the rights of a parent or guardian to the
custody of a child are subordinate to the interest of the child
itself. Where that interest demands it, the rights of the father,
mother, or guardian, all may be disregarded." And in the
Code 2 itself ". . . the court . . . in awarding the custody of
the child . . . shall give primary consideration to the welfare
of the child . . ."
In many states, a petition or application is filed at the
proper jurisdictional court prior to appointment as guardian.
Notice must be given that an application has been made, or
79 Supra, Note 77.
80 144 Va. 767, 130 S.E. 648 (1925).
81 151 Va. 136, 144 S.E. 432 (1928).
8 2 Va. Code § 31-50 (1950).
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notice of hearing on the application to the natural parents,
persons having custody of the minor, and the next of kin.
If notice were given to this more inclusive group of interested
parties, which could easily be incorporated into the present
statute, it would permit persons who may be more suitable
than the one who has applied, to contest the appointment.
This would serve to eliminate possible future litigation, probable
discord among the relatives, and at the same time provide
a procedure for procuring the best appointee.
By deductive reasoning it seems that if the State is so'
desirous of serving the best interests of the minor, it should
manifest this desire by providing a proper procedure that
would be most likely to achieve the result that the most suitable
person, not merely a suitable person, be appointed guardian.
Obviously, the best interests of the child are not served unless
the most suitable guardian is appointed. An injustice has
been done to the child and the State has not fully lived up
to its duty as representing the parental and protective power
of the Commonwealth when it permits a person less than
the most suitable to serve as guardian.
WILLIAM H. COLONA
